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Establishing Economic Independence 
in Haiti Through Public-Private 




In 1804, the Caribbean island of Haiti became the first black republic in the world 
after leading the only successful slave rebellion in history to result in the 
formation of an independent nation. Overflowing with valuable natural resources 
and equipped with a strategic Caribbean location, Haiti was positioned to remain 
one of the most prosperous territories in the world. But the price of independence 
was steep, and the country failed to thrive under crushing foreign intervention. 
But its story does not end there. 
This note examines the opportunities for Haiti to establish economic 
independence through public-private partnerships and foreign direct 
investments. First, this note will recount Haiti’s complicated past, from the native 
Taino Indians, the commencement of African slavery, to the historic slave 
rebellion and the fight for independence which elicited extreme backlash from the 
Western world. Next, this note will take an in-depth look at Brazil’s recent 
anticorruption success and apply those lessons to Haiti. By firmly addressing its 
own corruption issue, Haiti can create an environment that is welcoming to 
foreign investors, paving the way for transformative public-private partnerships. 
This note will then address the characteristics of an effective public-private 
partnership (P3)—a mechanism by which a government can partner with the 
private sector to fund and operate key infrastructures and stimulate economic 
development. Haiti’s lack of essential structure makes it ripe with opportunities 
for P3s in virtually every industry—water, sanitation, electricity, internet, 
transportation, education, and more. Developing this infrastructure will not only 
stabilize daily life for Haiti’s citizens but it can begin to attract foreign investors. 
As such, this note will explain the role of foreign direct investments (FDIs) in 
strengthening and expanding Haiti’s economy. In addition to injecting capital 
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into the country, FDIs can also help Haiti develop its human capital by providing 
jobs and skill training. 
This note proposes that through the development of essential infrastructure via 
P3s and the expansion of the economy with FDIs, Haiti can begin to establish 
economic independence and take its rightful place in the global economy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A strikingly beautiful island country brimming with tropical trees, 
sprawling mountain ranges, and sandy beaches that blend seamlessly into the 
clear Caribbean Sea, the Republic of Haiti is a historic nation of endless 
possibilities. Troubled by centuries of international interference and 
debilitating infighting, Haiti is currently and most commonly known as “the 
poorest country in the Western Hemisphere.”1 However, once globally 
renowned as “[t]he Pearl of the Antilles,”2 Haiti was never inherently 
impoverished. Its current economic condition was strategically and 
deliberately imposed through centuries of external military influence, 
unfavorable international trade laws and practices, and intentional 
government destabilization.3 
In order to become a thriving and economically independent nation, one 
that is not nearly eighty percent dependent on foreign aid, Haiti will have to 
transform itself in a minimum of three ways. First, essential infrastructure 
such as roads, sanitation, electricity, and transportation must be established, 
ideally through public-private partnerships (P3s) to make up for the lack of 
internal capital. Next, regulations and laws must be created and properly 
enforced in order to ensure the stability and protection of both foreign and 
domestic investments. This includes thorough anti-corruption legislation to 
regulate not just international participation but domestic private companies, 
which have crippled key sectors through their corrupt practices.4 Finally, 
with regulation and key infrastructure in place, Haiti would be ready for the 
third and key step to its economic development: foreign direct investments 
(FDIs). FDIs will build up the private sector and create jobs, in turn training 
Haiti’s vast but untapped labor force. 
Though the invitation of private investors sounds contrary to economic 
independence, it is the first step to stabilizing the economy to the point of 
independence, something the country has not seen in decades, if ever. The 
debilitated conditions of Haiti’s domestic infrastructure and the level of 
foreign aid currently provided by the United States5 create a climate that is 
ready for global companies to answer the country’s call for private foreign 
investors. The steady and continuous flow of knowledge and funds typical of 
FDIs would help bolster Haiti’s local economy while further strengthening 
their foothold in both the Caribbean and world economy. Haiti is open for 
                                                          
 1 CIA, CENTRAL AMERICA: HAITI, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print_ha.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2019). 
 2 MICHAEL S. VANHOOK, THE PEARL OF THE ANTILLES: A HISTORY OF HAITI 4 (2019). 
 3 Rocio Cara Labrador, Haiti’s Troubled Path to Development, GLOBAL TRADE (Apr. 
13 ,  2018) ,  http://www.globaltrademag.com/uncategorized/haitis-troubled-path-to
-development. 
 4 MARTHA N. KELLEY, OECD, ASSESSING THE INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN HAITI: POLICY 
CHALLENGES, 2 (2001), http://www.oecd.org/industry/inv/investmentstatisticsandanalysis/
1897610.pdf. 
 5 See CIA, supra note 1. 




The following argument will detail: 1) Haiti’s political and economic 
history and its demonstrated need for consistent and regulated foreign 
investors, 2) the U.S. legislation currently upholding trade law to Haiti, 3) 
the opportunities for infrastructure to be developed through P3s, 4) lessons 
to be learned from Brazil on effective anti-corruption reform, and 5) 
opportunities for and benefits of FDIs in Haiti on a local, Caribbean, and 
global economic scale. 
II. PAST AND PRESENT FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN HAITI 
A. Haiti’s Political and Economic History 
Haiti’s native Taino Indians were virtually annihilated shortly after 
Christopher Columbus’s 1492 arrival on the island of Hispaniola.6 The brutal 
slavery and oppression of the Taino people led Columbus’s fellow settler 
Bartolomé de Las Casas (“Protector of the Indians”) to suggest the 
importation of African slaves as an alternative to enslaving the native Taino 
Indians7 since Africans were believed to be stronger.8 Some consider this to 
be the beginning of the transatlantic slave trade in the New World.9 
Haiti was wealthy with natural resources, including sugarcane, organic 
tropical fruits, coffee, oil and natural gas, gold, copper,10 bauxite, calcium 
carbonate, marble, hydropower, and arable land.11 In order to harvest the 
copious resources of the island, France—the new owners of a third of 
Hispaniola—increased their importation and subsequent brutalization of 
African slaves.12 Focusing on sugar and forestry related industries for their 
trade,13 Saint Domingue—the French name for the island—soon became 
France’s most profitable colony.14 
                                                          
 6 See VANHOOK, supra note 2, at 9. 
 7 Id. at 10. 
 8 Dani Anthony, July 2015: Bartolomé de las Casas and 500 Years of Racial Injustice, 
ORIGINS: CURRENT EVENTS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, http://origins.osu.edu/milestones/
july-2015-bartolom-de-las-casas-and-500-years-racial-injustice, (last visited Mar. 11, 2020). 
 9 Sylvia Wynter, New Seville and the Conversion Experience of Bartolomé de Las Casas, 
JAM. J., May 1984, at 25, 25, https://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00090030/00043/27j. 
 10 Benjamin Elisha Sawe, What Are The Major Natural Resources Of Haiti?, 
WORLDATLAS (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-are-the-major-
natural-resources-of-haiti.html. 
 11 CIA, supra note 1. 
 12 See VANHOOK, supra note 2, at 10-12. 
 13 CIA, supra note 1. 
 14 Id. (“The French colony, based on forestry and sugar-related industries, became one of 
the wealthiest in the Caribbean but relied heavily on the forced labor of enslaved Africans and 
environmentally degrading practices.”); H.P. DAVIS, BLACK DEMOCRACY: THE STORY OF 
HAITI 23 (photo. reprint 2007) (Longmans, Green & Co 1928) (“From the middle of the 
eighteenth century to the French Revolution was a period of increasing and unexampled 
prosperity, French St.-Domingue being counted the richest colonial possession in the world.”). 
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After three centuries of African slavery on the island, Haiti became an 
independent nation in 1804 following a historic slave rebellion.15 The young 
nation changed its name from Saint Domingue to its Taino name of Ayiti or 
Haiti meaning “Land of High Mountains.”16 This historic victory made Haiti 
the first black republic in the world.17 
Haiti’s extraordinary feat marked a shift in global politics and world 
affairs, almost immediately changing the course of history for one future 
world superpower—the United States. France’s clandestine and renewed 
ownership of New Orleans and the potential for French interference instilled 
great fear in then-President Thomas Jefferson, who wrote to his U.S. Minister 
to France Robert Livingston, “[t]he day that France takes possession of New 
Orleans . . . we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation.”18 
Jefferson then sent Livingston to negotiate the purchase of New Orleans.19 
Under Napoleon Bonaparte, France had revived its vision of a French 
Empire in the New World.20 However, Bonaparte’s inability to defeat Haiti’s 
unrelenting slave revolt left France’s position severely weakened.21 When 
Livingston arrived to negotiate the purchase of Louisiana, France shocked 
the United States by offering the entirety of the Louisiana Territory for sale.22 
The slave revolt, still one year from its completion, was formidable enough 
to be one of the main contributing factors of the 1803 sale of more than 
828,000 square miles of land for $15 million—essentially doubling the 
United States’ size for only three cents per acre.23 The purchased land 
contained a part or whole of 15 future states, thus becoming a landmark of 
Jefferson’s presidency and a turning point for the United States’ expansion 
into the West.24 
However, Haiti’s multifaceted triumph and contribution to the global 
landscape was hardly received as such. Despite becoming an independent 
nation in 1804, it was not recognized as a country by the United States until 
nearly sixty years later in 1862.25 During this time, France, which had been 
profiting significantly from its colony in Haiti, demanded that Haiti pay it 
                                                          
 15 See VANHOOK, supra note 2, at 21. 
 16 See CIA, supra note 2. 
 17 Id. 
 18 History.com Editors, Louisiana Purchase, HIST., https://www.history.com/topics/
westward-expansion/louisiana-purchase (last updated June 6, 2019). 
 19 Id. 
 20 Erin Blakemore, The Louisiana Purchase Was Driven by a Slave Rebellion, HIST., 
https://www.history.com/news/louisiana-purchase-price-french-colonial-slave-rebellion (last 
updated Aug. 23, 2018). 
 21 Id. 
 22 See History.com Editors, supra note 18. 
 23 United States and France conclude the Louisiana Purchase, HIST., https://www.
history.com/this-day-in-history/louisiana-purchase-concluded (last updated July 17, 2019). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Kelsey Gasseling, The Threads of Justice: Economic Liberalization and the 
Secondhand Clothing Trade Between the U.S. and Haiti, 58 B.C.L. REV. 1279, 1298 (2017). 
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reparations for loss of income and for the slaves’ freedom; otherwise France 
threatened to invade the new nation26 and reinstitute slavery.27 
In order to maintain its historic freedom, the 21-year-old nation decided 
in 1825 to pay France’s demand of one hundred and fifty million gold 
francs.28 In February 1838, France decreased the amount to ninety million 
gold francs.29 Still, the damage was done. The total debt paid would 
eventually equal $21 billion in today’s currency.30 This astounding total 
includes not only the original principal but also the interest from loans that 
Haiti had to take from French banks to pay the debt.31 The repayment of these 
reparations, or the “independence debt,” created a financially devastating 
process that did not end until 1947, 122 years after the initial payment.32 Over 
the 122 years of repayment—which encompassed fundamental economic 
development years—the annual payments for the debt sometimes equaled 
about 80% of the new country’s gross domestic product, effectively 
constraining any significant growth.33 Brian Concannon, Jr., founder and 
executive director of the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, 
summarized the lasting impact of the independence debt on the young nation: 
“For an entire century, Haiti geared its economy to paying back the French 
debt and missed out on industrialization, education, and development of its 
government and democratic institutions. It really couldn’t develop.”34 
B. Haiti’s Demonstrated Need: Rice Dumping and the Right to Food 
The Haitian constitution protects a right to adequate food,35 but access 
to food remains one of Haiti’s most pressing needs36 and violated rights. In 
                                                          
 26 Id. 
 27 Blakemore, supra note 20. 
 28 H.P. DAVIS, BLACK DEMOCRACY: THE STORY OF HAITI 116-17 (photo. reprint 2007) 
(Longmans, Green & Co 1928). 
 29 Id. at 118; see also Gasseling, supra note 25, at 1299. 
 30 Kim Ives, HAITI: Independence Debt, Reparations for Slavery and Colonialism, and 
International “Aid”, GLOBAL RES. (May 10, 2013), https://www.globalresearch.ca/haiti-
independence-debt-reparations-for-slavery-and-colonialism-and-international-aid/5334619. 
 31 DAVIS, supra note 28, at 118. 
 32 Ives, supra note 30. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Labrador, supra note 3; see also Gasseling, supra note 25, at 1299 (“This staggering 
and longstanding debt encumbered Haiti’s process of economic development and 
industrialization, thus preventing the nation from gaining a competitive foothold in the global 
market.”) and Ives, supra note 30 (“After the debt was paid, Haitians were left with a 
chronically undeveloped economy, rampant poverty, and a spent land — today relatively 
minor environmental stresses like tropical storms cause catastrophic damage in vulnerable 
Haiti.”). 
 35 The Right to Food Around the Globe, FAO, http://www.fao.org/right-to-food-around-
the-globe/countries/hti/en/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2019). 
 36 Haiti: Deteriorating Economic State Impacts Humanitarian Situation, UNOCHA (Dec. 
27, 2019), https://www.unocha.org/story/haiti-deteriorating-economic-state-impacts-
humanitarian-situation [hereinafter Haiti: Economic State]. 
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fact, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs 
(UNOCHA) predicts that in 2020, at least “4.6 million Haitians—about 40% 
of the total population—will require urgent humanitarian assistance.”37 
While the Haitian government’s handling of the economy is at fault38, they 
were not solely responsible for this dire situation. 
In his article, Cheaper, Better, Longer-Lasting: A Rights-Based 
Approach to Disaster Response in Haiti, Brian Concannon Jr. succinctly 
summarizes the origins of Haiti’s current agricultural woes. 
In the 1980s, Haiti was a net exporter of agricultural produce. The 
agricultural sector collapsed, however, after the International 
Monetary Fund imposed structural adjustments in the 1980s and 
1990s, which required Haiti to decrease subsidies on 
domestic rice and remove tariffs on imported staples.39 Under 
pressure from the United States, Haiti also had to slash tariffs from 
45-50 [%] down to 0-15 [%].40 
In other words, the Haitian government was forced to stop providing its 
own farmers with economic incentives to grow rice domestically, while 
simultaneously slashing the taxes on imported rice that were meant to 
encourage consumption of the domestically grown rice.41 Instead, local rice 
became expensive to produce and sell, while U.S. producers were able to 
flood the Haitian market with their cheaply made surplus of rice.42 Without 
these protections, Haitian farmers could not compete with subsidized U.S. 
agricultural goods, and imports from the United States flooded the Haitian 
markets.43 
 The international trade practice known as dumping, thus, played out 
in textbook format in Haiti. 
[Dumping occurs when] a country or company exports a product at a 
price that is lower in the foreign importing market than the price in 
the exporter’s domestic market. Because dumping typically involves 
substantial export volumes of a product, it often endangers the 
financial viability of the product’s manufacturers or producers in the 
                                                          
 37 Id. 
 38 Id; see also Brian Concannon, Jr. & Beatrice Lindstrom, Cheaper, Better, Longer-
Lasting: A Rights-Based Approach to Disaster Response in Haiti, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
1145, 1163-1164 (2011). 
 39 Brian Concannon, Jr. & Beatrice Lindstrom, Cheaper, Better, Longer-Lasting: A 
Rights-Based Approach to Disaster Response in Haiti, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1145, 1163-
1164 (2011) (footnote omitted). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 




The Food Security Act of 1985 (the “1985 U.S. Farm Bill”) was a five-
year plan enacted “to extend and revise agricultural price support and related 
programs, to provide for agricultural export, resource conservation, farm 
credit, and agricultural research and related programs, to continue food 
assistance to low-income persons, to ensure consumers an abundance of food 
and fiber at reasonable prices, and for other purposes.”45 The Bill was 
essentially created to stimulate the stagnant farming economy in the United 
States, as illustrated by Title VI of the Bill which amended the Agricultural 
Act of 1949 and authorized “(1) specified support reductions; (2) reduced 
loan repayments; (3) deficiency payments; (4) acreage limitation, set-aside, 
and land diversion programs; and (5) export marketing certificates” for rice 
crops.46 
Though the problematic policy predated his presidential term by nearly 
a decade, Former President Bill Clinton stated in a 2010 Senate Committee 
Hearing on Global Health Programs that this policy was a “mistake” that 
exclusively benefited farmers in the United States. 
Since 1981, the United States has followed a policy until the last year, 
when we started rethinking it, that we rich countries that produce a lot 
of food should sell it to poor countries and relieve them of the burden 
of producing their own food, so that they can leap directly into the 
industrial era. It has not worked. [It may have] been good for some of 
my farmers in Arkansas, but it has not worked. 
It was a mistake. It was a mistake that I was a party to. I am not 
pointing the finger at anybody else. I have to live every day with the 
consequences of the lost capacity to produce rice in Haiti [to feed 
those people] because of what I did.47 
Former President Clinton acknowledged these failures in March 2010. 
Now, exactly a decade later, Haiti teeters on the edge of a severe food crisis 
and its most vulnerable populations—women and children—will bear the 
brunt of it.48 
As if the economic consequences of these practices were not enough, 
                                                          
 44 Dumping, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dumping.asp#ixzz
5XWK1rHS2 (last visited Feb. 4, 2019). 
 45 Food Security Act of 1985, H.R. 2100, 99th Cong., 99 Stat. 1354 (1985). 
 46 Summary: H.R.2100—99th Congress (1985-1986), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.
congress.gov/bill/99th-congress/house-bill/2100 (last visited Feb. 20, 2020). 
 47 Building on Success: New Directions in Global Health: Hearing Before the Comm. on 
Foreign Relations, 111th Cong. 9-10 (2010) (statement of Hon. William Jefferson Clinton, 
Chairman, William J. Clinton Foundation), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/031010_Transcript_Building%20on%20Success%20New%20Directions%20in%20
Global%20Health.pdf. 
 48 Haiti: Economic State, supra note 36. 
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there was at least one other side-effect. Because of the inability to make a 
living in the countryside with farmland and produce, many unemployed 
farmers and their families moved into Haiti’s cities—most notably the 
Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince—where they expected to find work.49 This 
migration is one of the contributing factors to Port-au-Prince’s severe 
overpopulation.50 The overpopulation established a deadly setting for the 
historic January 12, 2010 earthquake that all but demolished the city.51 
Though the reports vary, the Haitian government estimated the death toll in 
and around the city to be more than 300,000 lives.52 The large death toll was 
attributed, at least in part, to Haiti’s either outdated or lack of building 
codes.53This leads to Haiti’s need for the establishment of key infrastructure 
and regulations, which is a substantial opportunity for outside investors. 
According to a January 2008 memo regarding Haiti’s Inter-American 
Development Bank loan exactly two years before the deadly earthquake, 
“Haiti [had been] seeking international help to spur economic development 
in the country. President René Préval submitted that the country’s poverty, 
widespread unemployment, and the dilapidated state of infrastructure will be 
alleviated with increased international assistance.”54 However, with regard to 
foreign investments, Haiti still faces the challenge “to achieve a balance 
between the need for foreign capital and the fear of foreign economic 
domination.”55 
III. CARIBBEAN AND U.S. TRADE LAWS FOR HAITI 
Whether or not Haiti has fallen into further foreign economic 
domination depends on the trade laws to which it is a subject or a party. There 
have been at least four separate developments over the past few decades that 
are currently regulating Haiti’s interaction with the global markets: the 
Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership and its predecessor the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative, the HELP Act, and the HOPE Act. There is also the Caribbean 
Community Trade Agreement which regulates how Haiti interacts with the 
Caribbean markets.56 
                                                          
 49 Carl Lindskoog, What You’re Not Hearing about Haiti (But Should Be), COMMON 
DREAMS (Jan. 14, 2010), https://www.commondreams.org/views/2010/01/14/what-youre-
not-hearing-about-haiti-should-be. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Richard Pallardy, Haiti Earthquake of 2010, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
event/Haiti-earthquake-of-2010 (last updated Oct. 5, 2018). 
 53 Id. 
 54 HAITI: IDB Grants US $17.8MM Loan to Promote Rural Supply Chain (Jan. 20, 2008), 
TROUBLED COMPANY REPORTER (Oct. 27, 2006), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/
f16b46d9-c56a-490b-86d6-e406a8fb1cc9/? context=1000516. 
 55 Lewis D. Soloman & David H. Mirsky, Direct Foreign Investment in the Caribbean: 
A Legal and Policy Analysis, 11 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 257, 259 (1990). 
 56 Haiti - Trade Agreements, SELECTUSA.GOV, https://www.selectusa.gov/article?id=
Haiti-Trade-Agreements (last updated Aug. 3, 2019). 
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A. Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) 
On October 2, 2000, Haiti became a beneficiary of the Caribbean Basin 
Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA),57 which was passed by Congress as part of 
its Trade and Development Act of 200058 “to authorize a new trade and 
investment policy for sub-Saharan Africa, expand trade benefits to the 
countries in the Caribbean Basin, renew the generalized system of 
preferences, and reauthorize the trade adjustment assistance programs.”59 As 
such, the CBTPA is “designed to provide greater duty-free access to U.S. 
market for Caribbean and Central American nations.”60 An important 
predecessor of the CBTPA is the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). The CBI’s 
primary goal is to “facilitate the development of stable Caribbean Basin 
economies by providing beneficiary countries with duty-free access to the 
U.S. market for most goods.” 61 According to the Haiti Commercial Guide 
published by SelectUSA, an organization that facilitates business investment 
in the United States, “the CBTPA expands on the CBI program by allowing 
duty-free and quota-free treatment for imports of certain apparel from the 
region and by extending NAFTA-equivalent tariff treatment to a number of 
other products that were previously excluded from the CBI program.”62 The 
current CBTPA agreement is set to expire on September 30, 2020.63 
B. The HELP and HOPE Acts 
In order to help Haiti became an active member in the apparel and textile 
industry, Congress enacted the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through 
Partnership Encouragement (HOPE) Act of 2006, which went into effect on 
March 19, 2007.64 Congress provided HOPE in addition to other trade 
preferences to create a holistic trade relationship; these include the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP),65 Caribbean Basin Economic 
                                                          
 57 Id. 
 58 See Trade and Development Act of 2000, H.R. 434, 106th Cong., 114 Stat 251 (2000). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Haiti - Trade Agreements, supra note 56. 
 61 Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/caribbean-basin-
initiative-cbi (last visited Feb. 4, 2019). 
 62 Haiti - Trade Agreements, supra note 56. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, H.R. 6111, 109th Cong., 120 Stat. 2922 
(2006) (the HOPE Act is incorporated in Title V of this Act.). 
 65 See Trade Act of 1974, H.R. 10710, 93rd Cong., 88 Stat 1978 (1974); see also U.S. 
CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES (GSP), 
https://www.cbp.gov/trade/priority-issues/trade-agreements/special-trade-
legislation/generalized-system-preferences (Last updated February 26, 2020) (“The 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) provides duty-free treatment to goods of designated 
beneficiary countries. The program was authorized by the Trade Act of 1974 to promote 
economic growth in the developing countries and was implemented on January 1, 1976.”). 
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Recovery Act (CBERA),66 and CBTPA.67 According to the SelectUSA Haiti 
Commercial Guide, “eligibility criteria for the HOPE Act includes progress 
toward achieving a market-based economy, increasing employment, 
enhancing the rule of law, eliminating barriers to U.S. trade, combating 
corruption, and protecting internationally recognized human and worker 
rights.”68 More recently, after the January 12, 2010 earthquake, imports of 
apparel articles from Haiti to the United States in 2010 decreased by forty-
three percent in comparison to 2009 according to estimates by the 
Department of Commerce.69 As a result, the U.S. Congress passed the Haiti 
Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act.70 The bill extends the CBTPA and the 
HOPE Act through September 30, 2025.71 
The SelectUSA Haiti Commercial Guide concludes that the unique 
“trade preferences available under the HOPE and HELP Act are specifically 
designed for Haiti and are conditioned on both the Haitian government and 
individual producers meeting certain core labor standards and Haitian labor 
laws.”72 
IV. BALANCING FOREIGN PARTICIPATION WITH DOMESTIC 
INDEPENDENCE 
Foreign direct investments (FDIs) are one of Haiti’s options for 
bolstering its infrastructure beyond its current state and for helping the 
country engage with the global community on a more substantial level. FDIs 
allow an investor to invest in another country while maintaining significant 
control of the management and even operations of said investment.73 
The IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual, fifth edition (BPM5) defines 
FDI as a category of international investment that reflects the 
objective of a resident in one economy (the direct investor) obtaining 
a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another economy (the 
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direct investment enterprise). The lasting interest implies the 
existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and 
the direct investment enterprise, and a significant degree of influence 
by the investor on the management of the enterprise. A direct 
investment relationship is established when the direct investor has 
acquired 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power of 
an enterprise abroad.74 
According to Direct Foreign Investment in the Caribbean: A Legal and 
Policy Analysis, there are, at minimum, three considerations for countries 
when deciding to introduce FDIs:  
 
1) how to attract foreign investment while keeping foreign ownership of domestic 
resources to a minimum; 2) how to alleviate foreign investors’ concerns with respect 
to their legal rights to repatriate capital and profits without incurring a damaging 
drain of domestic foreign exchange resources; and 3) how to design their respective 
tax systems in such a way as to simultaneously foster economic growth and attract 
foreign investment while concurrently raising enough revenue to meet the budgetary 
requirements of the central government.75 
 
When Haiti attempts to create a domestic-foreign balance, it is checked 
by the global community. In a July 2018 World Trade Organization (WTO) 
meeting, the Dominican Republic and the United States questioned Haiti’s 
decision to “modify tariff concessions and apply tariffs higher than the 
bound levels in its WTO schedule of commitments.”76 This decision was 
preceded by Haiti’s accession to the Caribbean Community Trade 
Agreement (CARICOM).77 The Dominican Republic claimed that Haiti had 
“not notified the WTO of the decision to impose a ban on the importation of 
twenty-three products—mainly food and construction products.”78 The 
Dominican Republic also posed that as a result global exports to Haiti had 
decreased by forty-three percent since October 2015.79 Haiti acknowledged 
the proposed problem, saying that “discussions on harmonizing its custom 
tariff regime continue with the goal of fully engaging in intra-CARICOM 
trade while also ensuring that its schedule of concessions is in full conformity 
with WTO rules.”80 
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V. DEVELOPING ESSENTIAL INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGH 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
Before venturing any further into international trade, Haiti has massive 
internal opportunities for development. P3s can potentially open the door to 
FDIs. While FDIs will help enhance the private sector and those engaged in 
it, the P3s would allow private investors, both foreign and domestic, to 
partner on the construction of essential infrastructure, including Haiti’s 
notoriously underdeveloped roads.81 
Haiti has exhibited a need for consistent and regulated foreign investors. 
This need is not just for finances but to bring in knowledge and to remedy, at 
least in part, the human capital flight, or “brain drain” of the country.82 
According to a 2010 report by the U.S. Census Bureau, Haitians as an 
ancestry group in the United States have increased from “290,000 people . . 
. (0.1% of the total population) in 1990 to 548,000 (0.2%) in 2000. By 2009, 
an estimated [number of] 830,000 people . . . were living in the United States, 
or 0.3% of the total U.S. population.”83 According to a 2006 report by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “. . . 
[an] estimated 80[%] of the college-educated Haitians now live outside the 
country.”84 Besides Haitians fleeing during the Duvalier family dictatorship 
of the 1960s and 1970s, brain drain is another external force that is drawing 
talented and educated Haitians out of their country and its workforce. 
A different form of brain drain has been the rather intense poaching 
of Haitian talents by organizations and agencies of the international 
community, including the United Nations where the issue of the 
difference in salary scales between national institutions and foreign 
agencies is a well-known world-wide phenomenon that has never 
been addressed effectively.85 
P3s can start to develop the infrastructure that foreign direct investors 
will use to build up the workforce and that the country can then use to retain 
and develop their talent. P3s between a government agency and a private-
sector company can be used to finance, build, and operate projects, allowing 
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a project to be completed sooner or making it a possibility in the first place. 
The partnership is, of course, mutually beneficial: the city receives the 
funding for the project, as well as the completed infrastructure, while the 
private company may decide to receive the operating profits once the project 
is complete.86 
One of the most important pieces of infrastructure that could use 
investment and development is Haiti’s transportation system, particularly its 
roads. The country is fortunately making progress in this area. The World 
Bank and Haitian government collaborated to develop the country’s Nord 
(North) region and as a result, opened up a new road in February 2018 at the 
request of the government.87 The eight-kilometer ride from the village of 
Labadie to downtown Cap Haïtien used to take ninety minutes; now, this new 
road shortens the journey by a third of that time.88 The road, a modern and 
beautiful touch of needed urban efficiency, lays smoothly along the coast 
between the unspoken beauty of Haiti’s picturesque beaches and forested 
mountain ranges.89 Merline Pierre, a student from Labadee, attends school in 
Cap Haïtien. Her journey consists of a walk from her home—a boat—where 
she takes a ferry ride across clear blue waters to Cap Haïtien, and then takes 
a tap tap to school.90 The road, she says, used to be bad, filled with rocks, and 
people would often get sick on the route.91 Now it takes her just twenty to 
twenty-five minutes.92 Jean Oril, tap tap driver and President of the Labadee 
Transport Union, states that prior to the constructed road, there would never 
be any rides after four in the afternoon, which was extremely inefficient and 
highly dangerous in the case of medical emergencies.93 Previously, they were 
only able to transport at a maximum fifteen people for a daily total of three 
trips.94 The total amount of rides per day has since increased 167%.95 “This 
is a great asset for the North,” Oril says, “it will help develop the area a lot.”96 
Fritz Caillot, Haitian Minister of Public Works, Transports, Communication 
and Energy, agrees. He states that the road is very important for development 
and that by development, he also means tourism, but for that to happen, they 
still require fundamental infrastructure such as water, energy, and more 
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roads.97 Additionally, the residents in the communities along the road have 
shared that since construction commenced, they no longer feel threatened by 
rain, which often led to flooding.98 Channels and drainage works have been 
undertaken and retaining walls have been constructed to prevent landslides.99 
 
A. Mechanisms of A Meaningful Public-Private Partnership 
Isabel Marques de Sá, Chief Investment Officer of International Finance 
Corporation at the World Bank Group, states that P3s ideally “bring private 
sector competencies, efficiencies, and capital to improving public assets or 
services when governments lack the upfront cash.”100 P3s can be monumental 
in helping develop key infrastructure—power, ports, airports, water and 
waste treatment and more—and can encompass three stages of 
implementation: investment, operation, and maintenance. As such, P3s are 
also beneficial in stimulating economic development. 
The strength of P3s, however, can also be their weakness as the total 
expenditure can actually exceed that of direct public procurement since P3s 
may appeal to investors only if the public pays for the actual cost of the 
project as well as a profit for the private partners. While the practice of P3s 
has been traced back to fifteenth century Italian city-states, the current model 
“is effective for high-cost, high-visibility projects that involve social and 
technical complexities, with the potential to build in synergies, develop 
competencies, and create an effective framework for alliances and 
cooperation, especially when community stakeholders and experts are 
involved from the start.”101 
P3s are typically complex long-term projects that can span anywhere 
from fifteen to twenty years, and potentially even more. In that time, many 
factors can change, including, without limitation, politics, technology, the 
environment, and demographics. Therefore, the contract establishing the 
partnership needs to be artfully and thoughtfully structured to account for any 
potential changes. This includes having both incentives and penalties to 
encourage compliance throughout the duration of the contract.102 
P3s are also highly political because they are agreements between the 
government and the private sector. However, while private entities’ 
leadership and goals will likely remain relatively stable for a long period of 
time, governments will experience regular (and sometimes not-so-regular) 
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changes in leadership and the policies they seek to advance. This type of 
unpredictable change, especially in countries that are seen as politically 
unstable, causes private companies to require more assurances that the deal—
and more importantly, the payment—will be ensured regardless of the 
political landscape. As such, “[i]nvestors seek protection against such risks 
through guarantees, sometimes backed by a multilateral, international 
arbitration for dispute resolution and higher returns on equity.”103 On the 
other hand, the public sector also requires protection from the private 
sector.104 This protection can come in the form of performance guarantees 
that may either be unlimited or capped.105 
Overall, as the saying goes, “you can catch more flies with honey than 
with vinegar.” It is better to have the contract primarily governed by 
incentives than penalties so both parties are encouraged to see it to 
completion.106 
 
B. Navigating the Complexities of Public-Private Partnership 
There are a number of potential pitfalls to be cautious of when designing 
a P3. Marques de Sá warns that P3s are quite complex and that around fifty 
percent of proposed projects fail. “That is the nature of the business,”107 she 
writes. Because P3s are such complex structures, they touch upon many 
fields of expertise–accounting, taxes, economics, engineering, environment, 
finance, law–and often require the input of professionals in those fields. The 
projects usually move forwards slowly at first, being introduced in stages. 
Usually, engineering and economics are established first, then financial and 
legal achievability, and finally the political aspects and integration with the 
desires of the private sector.108 
One of the major challenges of the successful completion of a P3 comes 
from managing the requests of main stakeholders.109 Much negotiation and 
consensus are required on both sides throughout the duration of the planning, 
though private sector considerations are typically brought in during the later 
stages, which is when they are invited to comment on the draft agreements. 
Projects can fail when there are unresolvable differences, such as the 
government refusing to provide certain guarantees or an unacceptable 
allocation of risk. These can be deal breakers because the primary point is 
that P3s need to be financed so bankability is critical. In order to have that, 
the agreement must allocate risks properly. The financial tools that are 
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available for financing are ever developing, though Marques de Sá says that 
project bonds for middle-income markets are gaining traction, while regions 
that have a lot of liquidity have the active participation of local banks. In 
some developing countries, the local private banks are not able to provide 
long-term financing, so they may rely on leveraging or utilizing 
organizations, such as the World Bank’s International Financial Corporation 
or other similar entities.110 
In addition to the considerations of the public and private sectors, certain 
projects also require intense and thorough consideration of the region’s 
population.111 Some groups may be displaced or temporarily adversely 
impacted by a project.112 It is important for the government in particular to 
be transparent and clearly communicate early and often about the goals of 
the project and the realities of its implementation, otherwise there can be 
serious social and political effects.113 
The affordability to users and the government is another key 
consideration that organizers do not always understand. Governments tend 
to build these structures based on population sizes or a usability rate that will 
not manifest anytime soon. While the governments are planning ahead, the 
costs are immediate. As such, special attention must be given to demand 
analysis and costing to give the project the best shot at viability.114 
There is currently no universal manner of implementing P3s because 
every project involves a different government, sector, and set of private 
partners, among other variables. There are so many variables that, while there 
are standard best practices for the legal clauses, everything else is specific to 
the situation at hand. The feasibility of a P3 depends on the parties involved 
and what terms are reasonable to them. As previously stated, every market 
and country have their own risks and considerations. The risks may not 
always be worth the cost. That is up to the stakeholders to decide. Some 
environments may require more creative financing, drafting and 
implementation. A P3 can also be done in stages or address a sub issue 
instead. Marques de Sá shares the example of how Liberia’s electric system 
had been destroyed following their civil war, which ended in 2003. Instead 
of taking on the colossal risk of rebuilding the entire system, private 
institutions decided to instead commit to training electricity technicians and 
rehabilitating one of their electric plants with one entering into a management 
contract.115 Part of this was made possible by the creation of the Rural 
Renewable Energy Agency and the passage of Liberia Electricity Law, both 
in 2015, which created an avenue to allow private sector involvement for the 
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first time.116 This highlights the overall principle that P3s need a government 
champion in order to have enough power to survive negotiations. 
 
C. Public-Private Partnerships in Action 
P3s have been created at the state level in the United States, with the 
Pennsylvania Rapid Bridge Replacement Project being one of the more 
ambitious undertakings in the past few years. The Pennsylvania Department 
of Transportation (PennDOT) enacted a P3 to replace 558 of the state’s aging 
or structurally deficient bridges, “a first-of-its-kind bundling of the work for 
multiple bridges into one massive project under a single procurement.”117 
The National Council for Public-Private Partnerships boasts that this 
Pennsylvania project had already set many precedents before it even began: 
it is Pennsylvania’s first transportation P3, the nation’s first multi-asset 
availability payment concession, and the first project in which the developer 
won approval through the Federal Highway Administration’s Special 
Experimental Project program to conduct the environmental process.118 
According to John Schmidt, a partner and leading P3 attorney with Mayer 
Brown LLP, Pennsylvania’s “innovative use of P3 structure for multiple 
bridges has potential value as precedent in other areas.”119 As of April 18, 
2018, PennDOT has completed 400 of the 558 bridges. It attributes the speed 
and efficiency of the repairs to its unique relationship with Plenary Bridge 
Keystone Partners, which is receiving $889 million to replace the bridges and 
maintain them for twenty-five years. Previous contracting methods would 
have taken PennDOT up to twelve years to complete all the bridges,120 which 
speaks to the efficiency benefit of P3s. 
The type of investors that a country draws can depend on how the 
country’s market is classified. Market classification systems typically vary 
between indexers and benchmarks and change based on the indicators that 
are used by the governing body issuing the status. However, there are 
sweeping generalizations that may assist with basic categorization. The 
World Bank considers a country’s economy, particularly its relative wealth 
per capita.121 Thus, countries with the highest relative wealth per capita are 
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classified as developed countries. A few examples of developed countries are 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan. 
From there, countries with low, middle, and upper-middle incomes per 
capita, relative to incomes in other countries around the globe, are classified 
as developing or emerging. The Modern Index Strategy, or MSCI, is an 
indexing system that allows investors to make informed decisions through 
their analysis of world markets and the full equity opportunity set.122 MSCI 
examines each country’s economic development, liquidity, size and market 
accessibility in determining the market classification.123 Therefore, when the 
MSCI grants a country the “emerging market” label it signals to active and 
passive funds that use the MSCI Emerging Markets index as a benchmark 
that they can invest in companies listed in that country, potentially resulting 
in significant foreign investment.124 According to the MSCI, there were 
twenty-four emerging markets as of June 2018, including Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Egypt, Greece, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates.125 
Countries with even lower levels of income per capita are categorized 
as frontier markets. Frontier markets tend to have stock markets that are more 
volatile and less diverse, and the companies have poorer levels of corporate 
governance. Because of politics, development, demographics, and liquidity, 
frontier markets may be seen as less mature than emerging markets and thus 
more of an investment risk. As of the June 2018 MSCI Index, twenty-nine 
counties were frontier markets, including Argentina, Croatia, Jordan, Kenya, 
Nigeria, and Vietnam.126 
In 2013, Haiti’s then Minister of Finance and Economy Marie Carmelle 
Jean Marie announced that Haiti sought to grow from a frontier market to an 
emerging market by 2030. Its goals, she stated, were to “restore public 
finances and attract investment, including from foreign companies.”127 P3s 
were lauded as key in achieving the new status as they would bring in 
knowledge and money to implement essential infrastructures. However, Jean 
Marie acknowledged Haiti’s personal responsibility in creating a country and 
economic system that would attract investors. “We have to convince 
investors that we can manage our own domestic resources with efficacy and 
transparency,”128 she stated. This lack of accountability caused Canada to 
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freeze its official aid to Haiti for a period of time in 2013, citing a lack of 
accountability.129 When paired with accountability, efficacy and 
transparency, P3s can be an effective tool in a government’s quest to 
economic freedom. 
VI. ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES AS AN ASSURANCE FOR 
INVESTORS 
Corruption is by far Haiti’s largest problem, and it will have to be 
meaningfully addressed in order for investors to seriously and comfortably 
consider it as a viable investment option. Substantially reforming a corrupt 
government is possible; just look to Brazil. For several decades, the largest 
country in South America has been the setting for some of the most pervasive 
corruption on the continent. Ready to usher in a new era of accountability, 
security, and stability, Brazil drastically changed its landscape when it passed 
the Clean Company Act 2014. 
Brazil’s Clean Company Act 2014 (Law No. 12,846) holds companies 
responsible for the corrupt acts of their employees and introduces 
strict liability for those offences, meaning a company can be liable 
without a finding of fault. The Act provides strict civil and 
administrative penalties but no criminal penalties for companies. 
However, the Criminal Code establishes domestic criminal offences. 
Prohibited conduct includes financing, paying or subsidizing the 
performance of a prohibited act; bid rigging and fraud in public 
procurement; and direct/indirect acts of bribery/attempted bribery of 
Brazilian public officials/foreign public officials. Penalties for 
companies under the Act include fines of up to 20% of a company’s 
gross revenue from the previous year or suspension or dissolution of 
a company. Importantly, prosecutors are not required to prove a 
company’s representatives acted with criminal or corrupt intent, and 
companies are not afforded a legal defense for implementing 
‘adequate procedures’ to prevent corrupt acts.130 
According to Transparency International’s report, about one in three 
people who use public services in certain Latin American and Caribbean 
countries paid a bribe during the past year.131 An estimated ninety million 
people are expected to have paid bribes across twenty countries, which 
included Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Venezuela, and others.132 Of those that had paid bribes, men and women 
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responded in almost equal numbers, as did the wealthy and the poor.133 
However, because impoverished people have fewer disposable resources, 
paying bribes creates more of a strain on them.134 In Brazil, bribes were paid 
relatively equally across the board for all services: schools, hospitals, 
identification documents, utilities, police, and courts.135 
Despite these disappointing numbers across the region, seventy-four 
percent of Brazilians believe that it is socially acceptable to report a case of 
corruption;136 still, only about nine percent of all Caribbean citizens surveyed 
have actually reported corruption.137 For many, it appears that the benefits of 
holding corrupt officials accountable do not outweigh the risks of doing so. 
Twenty-eight percent of those who reported corruption experienced 
retaliation,138 which is understandable as nearly half of all respondents said 
that most or all police and politicians were corrupt.139 As a result of the study 
and their work, Transparency International made clear recommendations 
and goals for countries seeking true justice and freedom from corruption: 
This is why we are calling on governments in this region to reduce 
corruption in the police force and strengthen judicial systems, so that 
investigations can be conducted to the highest standards, judges made 
independent and professional, and the courts system adequately 
resourced to deal with corruption complaints. Whistleblower 
protection laws must be strictly enforced, and safe reporting 
mechanisms need to be created so that people who make a complaint 
are not at risk. Only then will citizens have the confidence to report 
an incident of corruption, safe in the knowledge that the perpetrator 
will face justice.140 
A. Brazil as a Model for Wide-Spread Corruption Reform 
Brazil’s corruption reform is multipronged: its reach goes beyond the 
federal level and its successful enforcement is more than just effective 
legislation. The Clean Company Act gives authorities and agencies at the 
local, state, and federal level the power to independently interpret and enforce 
the law.141 Proper enforcement of this powerful act requires buy-in and 
cooperation from every level of the government. This new cohesion has been 
displayed best in the investigation and prosecution of what has become the 
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largest corruption scandal not only in Brazil, but in the world. Codenamed 
“Operation Car Wash,” this corruption investigation launched in March 2014 
with an inspection into agents known as doleiros—also known as black 
market money dealers—who deceptively utilized petrol stations, car washes, 
and an assortment of other small businesses to “launder the profits of 
crime.”142 As far as corruption investigations go, Operation Car Wash started 
innocuously enough, but a law that was meant to hold regular businesses 
accountable ended up taking law enforcement much higher than they could 
have imagined, right to the door of one of the largest companies in the world: 
Petrobras.143 
A portmanteau of Petroleum and Brazil, Petrobras is Brazil’s national 
oil company and became the window into a previously unseen level of 
corruption. 
Petrobras was no ordinary company. As well as having the highest 
market valuation (and the largest debts) of any corporation in Latin 
America, it was a flagship for an emerging economy that was trying 
to tap the biggest oil discovery of the 21st century – huge new oil 
fields in deep waters off the coast of Rio de Janeiro. Petrobras 
accounted for more than an eighth of all investments in Brazil, 
providing hundreds of thousands of jobs in construction firms, 
shipyards and refineries, and forming business ties with international 
suppliers including Rolls-Royce and Samsung Heavy Industries.144 
Operation Car Wash found that the doleiros were essentially illicit 
intermediaries for a Petrobras executive and that the company was 
overpaying on contracts to certain companies where agreements had been 
formed to assure that their contractors were “guaranteed business on 
excessively lucrative terms if they agreed to channel a share of between 1% 
and 5% of every deal into secret slush funds. After diverting millions of 
dollars into those funds, Petrobras directors then used them to funnel money 
to the politicians who had appointed them in the first place, and to the 
political parties they represented.”145 Every person connected to the deals 
received bribes in forms that were not limited to cash, including luxury items 
like wine, yachts, and helicopters. Petrobras as a company was so central to 
the Brazilian economy and intertwined with this scandal that “as the Car 
Wash investigation was to prove, if you could unravel the secrets of this 
company, you would unravel the secrets of the state.”146 
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However, it is widely known that this level of prosecution—which now 
includes even former Presidents—would be virtually impossible were it not 
for legislative changes that Brazil made only a few years prior. Dilma 
Rousseff succeeded Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as leader of the Brazil’s 
Workers’ Party and advanced to become president of the country’s coalition 
government following the 2010 election.147 In the midst of 2013’s nationwide 
anti-corruption demonstrations, Rousseff quickly attempted to regain peace 
by fast-tracking laws aimed at eradicating systemic fraud.148 The new 
measures included allowing plea bargaining: prosecutors could now make 
deals with suspects, reducing their sentences in return for information that 
could lead to the arrest of more important figures—a first in Brazil’s 
history.149 This change became crucial in cultivating the cooperation of key 
suspects, leading to the discovery of the high-level corruption scheme and 
the prosecution of those suspects for their wrongdoings.150 
B. Applying Brazil’s Lessons to Haiti 
Brazil can be a case study for Haiti on how to curb corruption and 
positively influence the national attitude on it. Brazil has not hesitated to 
bring charges against even its President, showing that no one is above the 
law. This operation and its success have also served as a signal to investors 
that their deals and investments will be both honored and secured. For these 
reasons, Haiti must take steps to follow Brazil’s example and overthrow its 
culture of corruption if it hopes to cultivate an environment of stability and 
security that will attract investors. 
Haiti, whose Corruptions Perceptions Index score placed it near the 
bottom of the list in a four-way tie with Burundi, Uzbekistan and 
Zimbabwe,151 is making progress. 
In 2012, La Fondation Héritage pour Haïti (LFHH), the Haiti chapter 
of Transparency International (TI), in partnership with the Office of 
the Inspector General (OIG) of USAID, launched a new anti-
corruption Hotline to prevent fraudulent and corrupt practices within 
the programs and projects funded by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) in Haiti.152 
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The hotline is to allow victims or witnesses of corruption within these 
projects to report said crimes and initiate an investigation by the OIG of 
USAID. Additionally, in October 2018, Roger Richard Boncy, an American 
businessman of dual U.S. and Haitian citizenship, was charged with “one 
count of conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the 
Travel Act, one count of violating the Travel Act, and one count of 
conspiracy to commit money laundering.”153 His co-conspirator, a retired 
U.S. Army colonel, was also charged with the same crimes.154 They were 
both arrested and indicted for a plan to bribe a high-level foreign official in 
connection with a proposed $84 million port development project in Haiti.155 
The plan also included money laundering, as the accused told undercover 
agents posing as potential investors that they would funnel the payments 
through a non-profit organization that Boncy owned and managed. The duo 
also discussed getting a high-ranking official’s aide a job on the project in 
exchange for the official’s help in getting the project approved. This case is 
truly international in nature: the project is based in Haiti, the corporation 
through which the money was to be laundered was based in Maryland, and 
the communications which orchestrated the plan took place in a hotel in 
Boston, while one of the defendants lives in Spain.156 Though this matter is 
being prosecuted by the United States, Haiti’s cooperation in the resolution 
displays a desire to increase transparency in international and domestic 
business dealings. 
However, Haiti’s recent stance against corruption has resulted in one of 
the largest and most violent protest movements in its history. The streets of 
the island country erupted in protest during the summer of 2018 upon the 
revelation that the Haitian government had misappropriated more than $3.8 
billion from the PetroCaribe oil alliance. 
PetroCaribe is an agreement initiated by the government of Venezuela 
to provide preferential payment arrangement for petroleum and 
petroleum products to select Caribbean and Latin American countries. 
Venezuela offers oil agreements to member countries, which must pay 
60 percent of the bill within 90 days. The remaining 40 percent can be 
financed over 25 years at 1 percent interest, should oil prices stay 
above $40 per barrel. Financing takes into account the current cost of 
oil, allowing for more favorable terms when the cost of oil is higher. 
Countries may also offer goods and services to pay off oil shipments, 
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ranging from food such as beans and sugar to human capital such as 
doctors.157 
The money resulting from the PetroCaribe agreement was to be used 
“for infrastructure and social and economic projects.”158 Several audits have 
shown that it is either unclear where the PetroCaribe funds went or the money 
was mismanaged.159 Haitian President Jovenel Moise pledged to open an 
investigation into the use of the funds and promised to bring those 
responsible for any wrongdoing to justice,160 though the people are 
simultaneously calling for his resignation. The largest protests with that cry 
ironically occurred on November 18, a national holiday celebrating the 215th 
anniversary of the battle of Vertieres: “a major victory for Haiti’s slaves in 
the war for independence against the French army.”161 These protests even 
took on a different tone as some people flew the black and red version of the 
Haitian flag, which was replaced with the official blue and red flag following 
the forced departure of dictator Jean Claude Duvalier.162 During these 
protests, the cries of the people and those of Transparency are the same: “We 
want justice!”163 
VII. CURRENT FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN HAITI 
Haiti already has at least one example of a successful FDI. People may 
be surprised to learn that global beer brand Heineken has a majority 
ownership in the Haitian brewery Brasserie Nationale d’Haiti (BRANA) and, 
in the spirit of responsible corporate partnership, is “committed to being a 
partner for growth for the nation.”164 Heineken had been a minority owner 
since the 1970s but increased its stake to nearly 100% after the January 2010 
earthquake, which knocked the plant offline for two months.165 Heineken was 
impressed by Haiti’s popular lager beer Prestige and carbonated malt 
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beverage Malta H. The beer maker engaged in an expansion project that has 
benefits for both the company, its workers, and the Haitian economy.166 
Seeing the opportunity for development, they embarked on a $100 million 
renovation. The investment allows Heineken to significantly increase their 
local production capacity, enabling a forty percent rise in the volume of beer 
they produce in Haiti. The expansion program has included the addition of 
four 3,000-hectoliter fermenters and a Maische Filter, which is a particularly 
relevant addition, as it will allow them to use more locally sourced sorghum 
to brew their beers.167 Their strategy in the country also includes two more 
prongs. 
[T]he investment doesn’t stop here. At the heart of our ‘Brewing a 
Better Future’ initiative is our commitment to empower the 
communities in which we operate, with much focus on local sourcing 
– we believe that this will benefit not only our business, but also the 
livelihoods of Haiti’s agricultural workers. As part of this project, we 
have publicly stated our goal to locally source at least 20% of all raw 
materials for our brewed products from the region. Partnerships such 
as these are key to the success of our sustainability initiatives. 
Together with USAID, we work to coordinate local sourcing with 
local Haitian farmers through the Smallholder Farmers Alliance for 
Sorghum in Haiti (SMASH) project and other farming cooperatives. 
Addressing issues such as poor soil quality, effective seed 
germination and efficient harvest yields, SMASH was created to 
provide smallholder farmers with training in modern agricultural 
techniques and guarantee buyers for its produce. As a result, farmers 
have effectively doubled their crop yields for sorghum, a grain widely 
harvested in Haiti and particularly important in the production of 
Malta H. This represents a promising step forward not only for our 
business, but also for the region’s local economy.168 
In a 2015 Bloomberg News Special, farmers stated that their crops have 
developed more in the past year as a result of them using the more efficient 
farming techniques taught to them by Heineken.169 Heineken buys the 
sorghums directly from the farmers and transports the sorghum to the 
brewery in city for the farmers, reducing their travel time and giving them 
more time to farm and better their practices.170 “It’s all pieces of one big 
puzzle. Ultimately, we need to get this economy going. Farmers who earn 
more money will be consumers on the other side,” said then Heineken CFO 
René Hooft Graafland in the special.171 “[They will] not only drink more 
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beer, [but] buy more soap [and] they will buy more soup. They will buy stuff. 
So, this will be a bigger market as the economy gets better.”172 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Haiti’s natural resources, gorgeous island scenery and 
climate, large workforce, and ability to navigate the Caribbean and world 
markets makes it a prime candidate for the support of foreign investors. The 
country admittedly has much work to do with respect to its anti-corruption 
laws and regulations. By making such improvements, companies may feel 
more comfortable entering the market in public-private partnerships, which 
will allow for the development of key infrastructure, the lack of which is 
keeping the country in a perpetual state of poverty. Once key infrastructures 
such as roads, transportation systems, electricity, internet, and water are 
developed, foreign investors can come in to stimulate the private sector 
through foreign direct investments. These partnerships have the ability to 
transform that landscape of Haiti and allow it to be the leader in areas where 
it currently lacks such as medical services, technology, and education. 
One of the largest sources of wealth for Haiti is its people. Creative, 
resilient, hardworking, and plentiful, the vast numbers of citizens are waiting 
to be more and to do more, which can be a major allure for companies. 
However, the Haitian government must try something new and actually 
protect their citizens with actively enforced labor laws and an increased 
minimum wage that does not keep people hovering just above the poverty 
line with the potential to slip back under it at any point in time, goals which 
are furthered by the HOPE and HELP Acts. The enforcement of these laws 
and others will allow healthy competition, encourage innovation among the 
untapped and currently suppressed population, and ensure Haiti’s glory days 
are not behind it; they are ahead of it. Haiti is open for business and you are 
invited to join. 
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